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The world is what carries and holds 
our lives together. It is what we think about every day. 
The underworld is the unfathomable abyss beyond the world, 
upon which the world seems to float. It cannot be thought, but 
sometimes we can feel it enveloping the world like the night 
surrounds the day. (Do not get me wrong - the underworld does 
not “really” exist, it is not another world next to this one. 
Rather it is an image of the imperative to inquire into the 
abstract grounds of the world; just as the earth in Hölderlin 
and Rilke is the image of the reverse side of the world.) 
Being the nocturnal unground of the world, the underworld 
cannot be explained by everyday concepts. In order to sound it, 
one needs to enact a kind of epoché, or unthink one's ordinary 
world thoughts. This process elaborates unthinking into a 
different kind of skill. One thinks the underworld firstly by 
unthinking the world, and ultimately by unthinking the 
underworld itself. 
But what does unthinking the world mean? In order to grasp 
such awkward detours, further detours are needed.  
Our world cannot be taken for granted; questioning the 
given world leads to unthinking it. The underworld is the 
correlate of such unthinking. Following the ways of unthinking 
is easier with a precise image of the underworld.  
We will now take two detours: the first of which shows how 
an interpretation of the world in terms of ecology reveals an 
underworld of a wilder nature, and the second of which shows 
how an interpretation of the world in terms of human life 
reveals the underworld of death. These two images of the 
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underworld should prepare its philosophical interpretation in 
terms of the elemental.  
 
 
The natural unground of ecology  
 
First detour: why would the world of ecology be 
conditioned by the underworld of nature? 
Literally the logos of the oikos, ecology tends to project 
a closed world even when it does not aim at closure. In its 
beginning, ecology thought the world as organisms’ relation to 
their environment (Haeckel, Uexküll) and then as a system of 
relations and interactions between inorganic and organic 
elements of an environment. Gradually, not only natural but 
also psychological and social situations were articulated in 
terms of ecologies (Guattari), and today it makes sense to think 
the world as a whole in terms of a general ecology that also 
includes technology (Hörl). It also makes sense to think 
politics in terms of an ecology of human life, nonhuman life 
and things (Bennett). Does the generalization of ecology make 
the ancient term of nature obsolete, so that the contemporary 
world is an ecology without nature (Morton)? Or is nature the 
name of whatever breaks the fluid functioning of an anthropo-
techno-bio-logical ecosystem (Neyrat, Toadvine)? 
Ecology is certainly a rich idea. Whatever beings are 
included in an ecology, it is a living system or environment. 
An environment is not a given place; it is the system of 
relations between organisms and other things. These relations 
reside in the activities through which organisms modify their 
environment and are themselves modified. Life is plasticity and 
metamorphosis, and this is why every ecological situation is a 
changing one (and ecological action cannot be reduced to 
conservation). Today, we quite obviously understand our world 
as an ecological system, and the term ecology also invites us 
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to ask how to care about the common world. It is a difficult 
task that demands much more than ordinary politics, but still 
it follows the logic of “worldly” thinking. Ecology is difficult 
because it relates so many incommensurate things to one another: 
different human beings, animals and plants, but also atmospheric 
systems, technological networks, social and economic 
organizations, and so on. Political ecology is even more 
difficult because it does not only explain such relations but 
aims at managing them. The central question of political ecology 
is to decide whether this management should amount to regulating 
these relations or to negotiating them.  
If attending to ecology means regulating the relations 
between different kinds of beings, ecology is above all the 
responsibility of specialists who try to understand the 
objectively best way of harmonizing the different elements of 
an ecosystem. But if caring for ecology means negotiating these 
relations, it is a democratic project. Many accept that it is 
necessary to negotiate ecological justice between, for example, 
the Global South and the Global North. But it is less evident 
that ecological negotiations could also take place, say, between 
human beings, cows, prions and pharmaceuticals. 
Although an ecological situation is a changing one, 
constantly engaged in exchanges with external influences, it 
nonetheless tends towards a relative internal balance which 
defines it as a closure: it is a world. Now, if irruptions of 
unexpected external events come to destroy this balance, they 
jeopardize the internal harmony that keeps the ecosystem 
together. Because external events cause imbalance, they are 
generally perceived as catastrophes. Ecocatastrophes may appear 
to have natural causes (hurricanes, earthquakes) or 
technological ones (nuclear or information technological 
disasters). But on closer inspection none of them is simply 
natural or simply technological, for in the last instance they 
can all be explained in terms of general techno-ecology (as 
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Jean-Luc Nancy argued in relation to the Fukushima nuclear 
accident). From the perspective inside of an ecosystem the 
catastrophe arrives unexpectedly and incomprehensibly, so that 
it is not encountered knowingly but only affectively (with fear, 
terror, panic – or joy?) What characterizes it fundamentally is 
its mode of appearing, which is that of an unexpected event, 
and its mode of being, which is that of contingency, for it 
cannot fit into the logos of the ecological system but appears 
senseless, inexplicable and unjustifiable to it. Let us 
interpret this as an irruption of nature: in this 
interpretation, nature means something that cannot be 
assimilated to the world, that undoes the world, that is 
unworldly, entweltlich, as Heidegger once said. Seen in this 
way, nature is not a particular kind of being but a certain 
mode of irruption of uncontrollable elements that overwhelm the 
ordered world. A natural catastrophe can fall upon an ecological 
situation from the outside like a comet. But even a comet does 
not come from an absolute outside: it comes from a wider, wilder 
nature that the living system simply does not perceive. In many 
ways, the outside is already inside the ecological situation, 
manifested in the impossibility of assimilating existents 
entirely to the world system, and sometimes in their resistance 
to it. The best example of this is the human being, whose 
“nature” seems to be to turn against the very (eco)system in 
which s/he lives. Understood in this way, nature is the event 
that interrupts the smooth functioning of an ecology, not an 
event of truth (like religious events) but on the contrary the 
irruption of a contingent disturbance that suddenly becomes 
destinal. 
Ecological praxis must answer to such unexpected 
catastrophes. But also in the absence of striking events, 
ecological praxis must relate to alien, exterior nature. All 
practical thinking needs to justify itself by an idea of what 
the world is that the praxis arranges in the first place. This 
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thinking relies on anthropological, biological, technological 
and other kinds of knowledge, and knowledge for its part relies 
on something that could be called its ontological 
presuppositions. The latter consists in the questions from which 
thinking proceeds, in the non-political grounds of political 
thinking and in the non-scientific grounds of scientific 
thinking that do not ground the world but un-ground it, thus 
showing the inexplicable abyss under the world. The unground of 
the world cannot be thought in the same way as its ground. 
“Nature” is now the name of the unground of the world. Never 
mind if “nature” appears as concrete catastrophes that destroy 
ecosystems, or as theoretical questions that destroy systems of 
thought. Nature can be a physical reality or a biological one, 
an aesthetic or a sensual experience, or the thunderous 
experience of encountering Rilke's angel and beast. Thinking 
nature as a ground and an unground does not amount to deciding 
what it is, but to asking how it presents itself to us, inquiring 
into its specific modes of appearing as a ground that is 
simultaneously an unground. In asking how nature is given to 
us, we do not inquire into our own perception of it but into 
the ways in which it shows itself - sometimes dimly, sometimes 
dazzlingly, and always incommensurable with our capacity for 
apprehending it. From this point of view, nature is not an 
object, nor even matter, but the dimension of the elemental. 
Invisible, inaudible, unthinkable, it is, but it is not 
something; it carries and envelops but does not ground. 
Below, this nature that is “older” than thought will be 
called elemental nature. Then we will inquire into the elemental 
thinking that tries to think it, and show why elemental thinking 
requires a specific kind of unthinking. 
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Images of the netherworld 
 
How to approach elemental nature? How to think about it? 
Let us approach the task of thinking the sense of elemental 
thinking through another detour. This detour leads from the 
world of the living to the underworld of the dead. It unthinks 
philosophy by giving in to the fascination of images. The 
easiest images are so old that they feel like common myths. 
Being widely shared does not turn images into myths to be 
believed, but nonetheless they focalize attention simply and 
articulate ideas and perceptions. 
The first image is Plato's allegory of the cave in which 
ordinary people live chained. They can only see the shadows and 
ghosts of reality projected on the back wall by the demoniac 
puppeteers who operate the cave-cinema, until one of the chained 
people manages to break free and emerge into the sun of reality. 
Plato's image is so familiar that it is easy to subvert it. 
What if our world was not the cave anymore, but the overground 
world bathing in the bright sunlight of reason and science? We 
stand in the sun and see everything that the sun illuminates. 
There’s only one thing that we do not see, namely the ground 
under our feet that the sun of normal science cannot penetrate, 
but that seems to call for a kind of a psychoanalysis of the 
elemental ground (like Bachelard’s psychoanalysis of fire). In 
order to know where we are standing, we should get underground 
and descend back to the cave - but we do not know how to do it 
anymore.  Light-bearer Plato himself said that getting back to 
the cave is as difficult as getting out of it, as each passage 
imposes a conversion that painfully wrings the soul inside out. 
Where is the opening of the cave? How to descend into it, 
knowing that the passage is pitch black, winding, rocky and 
stony? If ever we found our way down into the cavern and if 
ever the legendary prisoners and puppeteers were still there, 
playing their strange and cruel game, how could we make sense 
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of what is going on, and how could we communicate with the livid 
protagonists of the shadow play? Most probably our eyes could 
not see, our ears could not hear, our minds could not understand 
the subterranean shadow images and echoing words. 
Confused by the moving shadows, we could try out echoing 
out in order to evaluate the space of the cave. But neither 
seeing nor sounding penetrates further than that. We cannot 
penetrate into the very earth that holds the cave, we cannot 
penetrate into the very rock of which the cavern is but a 
reluctant withdrawal. The inside of the rock is its very 
materiality, what the eyes cannot see because it obscures 
visibility, what the ears cannot hear because it dampens sound, 
what the mind cannot figure because it is too dense to allow 
figuration. 
The second image of the underworld comes from my pre-
Christian ancestors who saw the underworld as the world of the 
dead. They thought that after the overground life, the dead go 
on living in the underground world with its own underground 
suns and moons and forests and waterways. Maybe the dead were 
quite similar to what they were in the world of the living, 
maybe they were more evasive and shadowlike, maybe they turned 
gradually into strange-looking earth sprites, gnomes and trolls 
(before monotheism these were not dim-witted monsters). The 
frontier between the world and the underworld was never really 
watertight, so the ghosts could see the living and the living 
could see the ghosts - although the difference between their 
senses and their tongues made communication difficult. This is 
why shamans sought ways to dim daily consciousness in a trance, 
allowing them to go under and speak with the dead. The dead 
seemed to live in another time, for they could tell the shamans 
about the past and future.  
Of course, one does not need Fenno-Ugrian ancestry to seek 
communication with the netherworld, for one finds similar 
conceptions of life and death throughout the mythologies of the 
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world, for example in Kenya; and in descriptions of shamanistic 
travels to the world of the dead in the writing of Homer, Virgil 
and Dante. Today, communing with the dead is not a religion but 
only an image. But it is a useful image of the way our thoughts 
are not only haunted by others and by others' thoughts, but 
also by the thoughts of the dead and by the deads’ thoughts in 
us (Derrida). We could not think without this haunting – but 
because of the haunting, we never really know who thinks in us 
when we think. Whatever our coherent everyday world thoughts 
might be, they are always conditioned by muffled, splintered 
underworld thoughts of the dead. 
The figure of the dead that the shaman-poet encounters in 
Hades illustrates the difficulty of thinking about the 
underworld. It is not enough to overcome one's fear of the 
underworld. In order to penetrate into it one must accept to 
become other, dare to host another way of thinking, and yet 
also conserve one's own thoughts, so as to compare the two ways 
of thinking. Thinking needs these splittings and detours. 
Passing from one world to another is also a kind of an epoché, 
not the one that reveals the fundamental structure of 
consciousness (Husserl) but the one that reveals the fundamental 
structure of the world. While the ordinary world stands for the 
ordinary temporality of calculable causality, inheritance and 
probability, the underworld stands for another temporality, the 
time of incalculable strokes of destiny and unexpected events, 
that is revealed in the legend. 
 
 
Thinking the elemental 
 
In these two images, the underworld that contradicts but 
nonetheless conditions the world was conceived as raw nature 
behind the functional ecosystem and as death behind human 
society. These images are meant to illustrate the difficulty of 
approaching the underworld. In order to fully understand this 
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difficulty, however, we need to turn towards philosophy, because 
it specializes in questions of relating and approaching. Let us 
now ask, at last without detours, how we can think about the 
underworld. Let us first see how the underworld gives itself to 
philosophical thought, and after that what kind of (un)thinking 
corresponds to it. 
Of course, “underworld” is not really a philosophical 
term. Here it is meant to name the reverse side of the phenomenal 
world that opens towards an ontological interrogation of the 
world’s being. The term is somewhat misleading because it may 
evoke the idea of another world below or beside the phenomenal 
world. But it is not another world, it is not situated within 
the world nor without it. It is simply the question of the 
primordial materiality of the phenomenal world. 
In ancient philosophy, the materiality of the world has 
sometimes been approached in terms of the elemental. Elemental 
materiality does not coincide with the sensible matter that you 
can touch, nor with the theoretical matter that natural science 
can explain: it is the abstract materiality of existence. The 
elemental is a very old philosophical term that originally 
designated the primordial substances of nature. In Antiquity, 
it designated either the four elements (water, air, earth, fire) 
or the simple elementary bodies (atoms, stoikheia of language). 
In early modern science it came to designate the elementary 
realities like space and time, the elementary tissues of the 
living or the elementary passions of the soul. Today the term 
retains no scientific meaning, but it is still used in 
phenomenology to approach the question of materiality. The 
phenomenological question of materiality does not point at any 
construction blocs of reality but only at the abstract question 
of the conditions of experience, of appearing, and finally of 
being. For instance, ever since Schelling, “light” is the 
element of reason (or of thinking) that designates what makes 
visible without being visible itself and that includes the 
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sensible and rational conditions of experience. Schelling 
coupled light with “gravity,” which is the element of being 
that signifies the inexplicable fact that there is being, that 
later phenomenologists designate with the elementals of the 
fysis, the flesh, the es gibt or the il y a. Blanchot examined 
the elemental in terms of the night, and recently, in another 
stratum of Alienocene, Manchev in terms of the clouds. Such 
names are different detours for making sense of a dimension of 
being of which there is no direct experience but in which 
experience nonetheless happens. Instead of choosing one of the 
possible poetic names of the elemental, I prefer to call it 
simply the elemental, in order to avoid fixing its nature and 
in order to point, instead, at the very force of generating 
ever-new images of the invisible, inaudible, unimaginable fact 
of being.  
What is the elemental materiality of the world? 
Firstly, the elemental is nothing. It is, but it is not a 
thing. It is nothing, like being is the being of beings without 
ever being there at hands. It is not a thing but a specific 
mode of givenness of the ground of things: the withdrawal of 
being in beings, the refusal of ground in things, the absence 
of reason in reality. The elemental is the absence of 
transcendental ground (such as God or causa sui), an absence 
which signals that the negation of such a ground does not amount 
to the empty nihil of nihilism but to another way of 
encountering being. 
Secondly, the elemental is therefore not a blunt 
nothingness but the nothing of being. It is a kind of a generous 
nothingness that is not simply absent but signals its own 
absence: it is not an empty void but a dynamic nothingness that 
calls and beacons from afar. When the elemental signifies, it 
moves us with an overwhelming force that carries us away from 
familiar grounds. Such irruptions push (human) life from its 
familiar grounds, but they can also draw it towards unheard-of 
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possibilities. Sometimes, the presence of the elemental can be 
felt in unexpected singular events that do not fit into the 
horizon of expectations. In these cases, the absence of the 
conditions of an event comes to the fore when something occurs 
that cannot be explained by the laws of the familiar world, but 
appears surprising in regard to known causalities, teleologies 
and destinies. Unlike the Ereignis, such an event is not a 
destinal event of sense, it is contingent. The surprise of the 
contingent occurrence is precisely the mode of “nature” that 
contests the established “ecosystem.” Sometimes, on the other 
hand, the elemental manifests itself as a general atmosphere of 
the undoing of the world, and not in a particular event. It 
signals itself within presence as the absence that conditions 
the presence, and it signals itself within reality as the 
absence of reason of reality. The nothingness of the world does 
not mean that there is no world at all but that the world is 
affected by its own undoing: it unworlds.  
Although it is actually a category mistake to give 
concrete examples of such abstract ontological considerations, 
I will risk an illustration of the loss of ground depicted 
above. The surge of the elemental makes us loose familiar 
ground. Earlier we explained the familiar ground as the 
ecosystem in which we live. In that context, the irruption of 
the elemental was demonstrated through the irruption of raw 
nature, especially in the form of natural catastrophe. A 
singular event that shakes familiar ground could be, for 
example, the recent realization that the estimates of CO2 
development in the atmosphere may have to be radically changed 
if the melting of Siberian permafrost provokes the release of 
huge amounts of methane. Obviously, this is surprising only for 
a while, for as soon as the phenomenon is noticed, specialists 
start to adjust their picture of global climate to it. This is 
why the example of Siberian permafrost is so imperfect, but on 
the other hand, I could not describe a truly surprising event 
6/
19
/2
01
9 
ALIENOCENE – THEORY/FICTION 
 
 
12 
occurring right now because I would not be aware of it. On a 
general level, the atmosphere of unworlding cannot be reduced 
to any particular events because it is an existential tonality. 
However, maybe one could illustrate the general existential 
tonality of unworlding through the paralyzing feeling (“climate 
anguish”) aroused by the thought of the complex and overwhelming 
processes of climate change and sixth extinction. 
Thirdly, because we are attracted towards the elemental 
but cannot see what it is, we cannot help but imagine it. We 
have already met many of its images: fire, earth, death, night, 
clouds. Such images do not have the status of elementals if 
they only reflect individual experiences. Elementals are not 
perceptions, but abstract ways of articulating the materiality 
of being. They are images - not images of something, but 
originary images that do not refer to an origin but articulate 
the possibility of sense. It is impossible to tell where such 
images rise from: it is as if they were generated by a productive 
imagination that disseminates virtual images of the materiality 
of being. Such an imagination is neither individual nor 
collective but impersonal and anonymous. Correlatively, images 
of the elemental are neither personal dreams nor expressions of 
anything like a collective unconsciousness. Still they can 
structure elemental thinking when they come to be shared by 
more than one person, so that they can be reasoned and debated 
about. 
 
The elemental lends itself to philosophical thought as an 
underworld that thought cannot encounter directly, but that 
requires detours through a specific kind of unthinking. 
Unthinking originally translates the French dépenser, which 
evokes three different gestures of thinking: dé-penser, or 
unthinking in the sense of not thinking; déconstruire, or 
deconstructing existent discourses; and dépenser, or lavishing 
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images of the unthought. “Unthinking the underworld” combines 
these three gestures.  
Firstly, thinking the elemental is unthinking as not 
thinking – because the elemental is a nothingness where there 
is nothing to be thought. There is nothing present-at-hand that 
ordinary wordly thinking could point to and seize. Thinking 
about such a nothingness demands an undoing of ordinary ways of 
thinking. However, it does not mean ceasing thought altogether 
and annulling consciousness. It means changing attitude, as 
suggested by the images of descending to the Platonic cave or 
to the underworld of the dead, only this time the attitude 
should be changed from ordinary thinking into the greater 
abstraction of a transcendental act. It is a kind of suspension 
of thinking while still thinking, an epoché, not the epoché 
described by Husserl that reveals the structures of the thinking 
consciousness to itself, but another epoché that reveals the 
elemental structures of the world. 
Secondly, thinking the elemental is unthinking in the 
sense of deconstructing given figures of thought. Of course, 
whatever occurs in the world can be perceived as a surprise, by 
somebody. However, in a stronger sense of the word events come 
forth as surprises when an entire (scientific) community tries 
to account for them, fails, and thus sees that its established 
ways of accounting for the world's events are insufficient. 
Surprise comes forth as contingency when the community tries to 
account for its necessity or at least possibility, fails, and 
thus realizes that the existent ways of explaining are 
insufficient. This is how the events themselves “deconstruct” 
the laws of the ordinary world. They are the apparitions of 
natural catastrophes in ecosystems that cannot account for them, 
or apparitions of specters in the world of the living that have 
no place for them.  
Thirdly, thinking the elemental is dépenser l'élémentaire. 
“Unthinking” is too negative a term for translating dépenser, 
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because it is really a question of prodigally lavishing and 
spending the treasures of elemental imagination. The images of 
the elemental cannot really be invented by us. They are already 
available, offered by the impersonal elemental imagination in 
us, like the images of raw nature and the dead were already 
available for us. What we can do is each time choosing the most 
telling of the available images, critically unthinking them, 
and gently elaborating them into materials of philosophical 
invention. 
__________________________________ 
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